You ask a loaded question, as it assumes that all "anarchists" most certainly have a "problem with morality." You provide little definition for either term, which makes it frustratingly difficult to answer. Fortunately, Enkidu did contribute a distinction that could serve just fine for the sake of this discussion, although I would extend "morality" to include preconceived notions of "right and wrong," if you will, that one asserts as universally true within any context. I suppose that one could relate attempted enforcement of norms by peers to assertions of authority.
For instance, Libertaro's comment alludes to a "universal ethical standard," asserts the injustice of certain consumer habits, and concludes by equating their perceptions of the situation as a medium for general interpretation. This seems like a case of morality.
I perceived the ethics that Enkidu offered in this way:
When a group of individuals agrees upon a limited set of values that bear relevance to their social context instead of accepting what others might assert as invariably applicable, critical thinking can suddenly take place on a mutual level. I think of ethics as having an element of flexibility that morality does not allow for. The conclusions reached by critically thinking about a situation certainly apply to that situation, but another context would demand reevaluation. I distinguish ethics from morals in the sense that morality maintains a notion of invariable righteousness, whereas ethical thinking pursues ever-broader perspectives in order to establish informed positions from which one may make decisions. We can think of "anarchism," in the generalized use it sees here, as both a blanket term denoting common ground held by many similar but different positions that might carry more specific contextual significance.
I make a tricky argument for ethics that borders on self-contradiction. In fact, you could think of my argument as an attempt to establish such a position between us. This position depends on accepting certain axioms for the sake of our conversation, beginning with the idea that one cannot reach a complete perspective. Thus, we have two options for further building our position. First, we could try to devalue any position we create because we cannot hope to fully inform ourselves of any situation, but a devaluation of value on any ground seems paradoxical to me. We can, instead, place value on our positions precisely because of their socially-constructed nature. We can because we decide to.
